

## **Modification of Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the Russian Federation**

### **SEC. XXX. Modification of Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the Russian Federation.**

(a) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Subsection (b) of section 1234 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (134 Stat. 3936) is amended—

(1) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following paragraph:

“(2) An assessment of developments in the military doctrine, force structure, training, operational concepts, joint command and organizational structures, and significant military operations and deployments of the Russian Armed Forces, including Russian adaptation based on its operations in Ukraine.

(2) in paragraph (5)—

(A) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following subparagraph:

“(B) Russia’s military cooperation with and presence in Belarus, including transfers or deployments of Russian nuclear-capable weapon systems to Belarus;”.

(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as subparagraphs (C) and (D), respectively.

(3) by striking paragraph (9) and inserting the following paragraph and subparagraphs:

“(9) An assessment of the impact of United States and international sanctions on the Russian military’s reconstitution efforts, including analyses of the following elements:

(A) an assessment of the impact of removing sanctions on the Russian military’s reconstitution efforts; and

(B) a description of Russian circumvention of Western sanctions and export controls targeting the Russian military industrial base, including the role of the People’s Republic of China and other adversarial state and non-state actors.”

(4) in paragraph (10)—

(A) by striking the period at the end and inserting “and shared them with the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

(5) in paragraph (12)—

(A) by striking the period at the end and inserting “, including how Russia is helping to increase the military capability, capacity, and readiness of the People’s Liberation Army.”

(6) by striking paragraph (13) and inserting the following paragraph:

“(13) An assessment of the military cooperation between Russia and the People’s Republic of China, including weapons development, defense trade, combined military exercises, and the sharing of intelligence, and how that cooperation impacts the United States, its interests, and its allies and partners.”

(7) in paragraph (17)—

(A) by striking the period at the end and inserting “, including Russia’s security cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Houthis.”

(8) by striking paragraph (21) and inserting the following paragraph:

“(21) An assessment of the character, extent, trajectory, and consequence of Russia’s security cooperation with Iran, the People’s Republic of China, and North Korea, including Russia’s provision of intelligence, drones, or other military-related support to Iran after 2022.”

(9) in paragraph (22)—

(A) by striking “mass destruction or missile systems” and inserting “mass destruction, missile systems, one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, and other significant weapons systems,”.

(10) by adding after paragraph (29) the following paragraphs:

“(30) An assessment of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy and capabilities, including— (A) Russia’s information warfare strategy and capabilities, including the use of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda in social and traditional media; (B) Russia’s financing of political parties, think tanks, media organizations, and academic institutions; (C) Russia’s malicious cyber activities; (D) Russia’s use of coercive economic tools, including sanctions, market access, and differential pricing, especially in energy exports; (E) Russia’s use of criminal networks and corruption to achieve political objectives; (F) Russian sabotage and other “active measures” in Western countries; and (G) Russian intelligence gathering and recruitment of assets, including journalists and media personalities.

(31) An assessment of the involvement of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation (including the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)), and any proxy force, irregular force, or private military or security company acting on behalf of, with the support of, or in coordination with the Government of the Russian Federation, in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or facilitation of trafficking in narcotics and other controlled substances.”

(11) by redesignating paragraphs (30), (31), and (32) as paragraphs (32), (33), and (34), respectively.

**Ramseyer Language:**

(a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than June 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the security and military strategies and capabilities of the Russian Federation (in this section referred to as “Russia”).

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

- (1) The goals, factors, and trends shaping Russia’s security strategy and military strategy, including military spending and investment priorities.

- (2) An assessment of developments in the military doctrine, force structure, training, operational concepts, joint command and organizational structures, and significant military operations and deployments of the Russian Armed Forces, including Russian adaptation based on its operations in Ukraine.**
- (3) An assessment of the force structure, readiness, and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.
- (4) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in the Arctic and the North Atlantic region.
- (5) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of the Russian Armed Forces as they relate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including—
  - (A) the force posture of Russian Armed Forces deployed adjacent to NATO’s borders, including in Kaliningrad;
  - (B) Russia’s military cooperation with and presence in Belarus, including transfers or deployments of Russian nuclear-capable weapon systems to Belarus;**
  - (C) a list and description of all known violations by Russia of NATO airspace during the reporting period, and to the extent feasible, an evaluation of whether such incidents were intentional or unintentional; and**
  - (D) an assessment of the threat posed to NATO bases, critical infrastructure, and other industrial and military targets posed by Russian hybrid attacks.**
- (6) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of the Russian Armed Forces deployed in Ukraine or adjacent to Ukraine's borders.
- (7) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of the Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic and Black Seas.
- (8) An assessment of the reconstitution efforts of the Russian Armed Forces, including its ability to restore losses from the war in Ukraine and to expand its force beyond 2022 levels.
- (9) An assessment of the impact of United States and international sanctions on the Russian military’s reconstitution efforts, including analyses of the following elements:**
  - (A) an assessment of the impact of removing sanctions on the Russian military’s reconstitution efforts; and**
  - (B) a description of Russian circumvention of Western sanctions and export controls targeting the Russian military industrial base, including the role of the People’s Republic of China and other adversarial state and non-state actors.**
- (10) An assessment of what the Russian Armed Forces have learned from the war in Ukraine and how Russia has applied those lessons **and shared them with the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.**
- (11) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of Russia that affect countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- (12) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of Russia that affect countries in the Indo-Pacific, with a specific emphasis on how such strategy, objectives, and force posture affect the People’s Republic of China, **including how Russia is helping to increase the military capability, capacity, and readiness of the People’s Liberation Army.**
- (13) An assessment of the military cooperation between Russia and the People’s Republic of China, including weapons development, defense trade, combined military exercises, and the sharing of intelligence, and how that cooperation impacts the United States, its interests, and its allies and partners.**
- (14) An assessment of the objectives of Russia’s treaty alliance with North Korea, including analyses of the following elements:
  - (A) Any technology sharing pertaining to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
  - (B) Any cooperation on missile or space launch-related technology.
  - (C) Arms trade.

- (D) Tactical and operational military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, including lessons learned and compensation derived from cooperative training and participation in actual conflict.
- (15) An assessment of Russia's military cooperation with India.
- (16) An assessment of Russia's coercive behavior directed at United States allies in the Indo-Pacific.
- (17) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of Russia that affect countries in the Middle East, **including Russia's security cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and terrorist organizations such as Hamas and the Houthis.**
- (18) An assessment of the military strategy, objectives, and force posture of Russia that affect countries in Africa.
- (19) A description of Russia's overseas military basing, military logistics capabilities, and infrastructure to project power.
- (20) A summary of all significant Russian cooperation with foreign military and security forces, including major training and exercises, foreign deployments, and basing agreements--specifying for each Russian foreign deployment the number of forces deployed, the types of capabilities deployed, the length of the deployment, and any agreement enabling or governing the deployment.
- (21) **An assessment of the character, extent, trajectory, and consequence of Russia's security cooperation with Iran, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea, including Russia's provision of intelligence, drones, or other military-related support to Iran after 2022.**
- (22) An assessment of the proliferation activities of Russia and Russian entities, including activities relating to the supply of materials, technologies, or expertise relating to nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, missile systems, **one-way attack unmanned aerial systems, and other significant weapons systems**, to other states or non-state actors.
- (23) An assessment of Russia's nuclear program and capabilities, including—
  - (A) its nuclear strategy and associated doctrines;
  - (B) the size and state of its stockpile and projections of its future arsenals;
  - (C) its civil and military production capacities; and
  - (D) the modernization and force structure of its strategic forces.
- (24) An assessment of the use by Russia of chemical weapons, including chemical munitions, during the preceding year either as part of an armed conflict or against individuals outside an armed conflict.
- (25) A description of Russia's current missile defense strategy and capabilities, including efforts to develop missile defense capabilities.
- (26) A description of Russia's anti-access and area denial capabilities.
- (27) A description of Russia's command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance modernization program and capabilities and the applications for such program and capabilities for precision-guided weapons.
- (28) An assessment of Russia's space and counterspace programs and capabilities.
- (29) An assessment of Russia's cyberwarfare and electronic warfare capabilities, including details on the number of malicious cyber incidents originating from Russia against Department of Defense infrastructure.
- (30) **An assessment of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy and capabilities, including— (A) Russia's information warfare strategy and capabilities, including the use of misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda in social and traditional media; (B) Russia's financing of political parties, think tanks, media organizations, and academic institutions; (C) Russia's malicious cyber activities; (D) Russia's use of coercive economic tools, including sanctions, market access, and differential pricing, especially in energy exports; (E) Russia's use of criminal networks and corruption to achieve political objectives; (F) Russian sabotage and**

**other “active measures” in Western countries; and (G) Russian intelligence gathering and recruitment of assets, including journalists and media personalities.**

**(31) An assessment of the involvement of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation (including the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)), and any proxy force, irregular force, or private military or security company acting on behalf of, with the support of, or in coordination with the Government of the Russian Federation, in the production, transportation, distribution, financing, or facilitation of trafficking in narcotics and other controlled substances.**

**(32)** An assessment of any influence operations or campaigns by Russia targeting the United States, any military alliances and partnerships of which the United States is a member, or treaty allies of the United States, including—

(A) the objectives of such operations;

(B) the tactics, techniques, and procedures used;

(C) the impact of such operations on the United States, military alliances or partnerships of which the United States is a member, or treaty allies of the United States;

(D) detail regarding any campaign that specifically targeted Department of Defense personnel; and

(E) the metrics used to judge the impact of such operations.

**(33)** An assessment of how Russian private military companies are being utilized to advance the security interests of Russia, including by securing access to raw materials.

**(34)** Other military and security developments involving Russia that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.”

(c) NONDUPLICATION.—If any information required under subsection (b) has been included in another report or notification previously submitted to Congress as required by law, the Secretary of Defense may provide a list of such reports and notifications at the time of submitting the report required by subsection (a) in lieu of including such information in the report required by subsection (a).

(d) PUBLISHING REQUIREMENT.—Upon submission of the report required under subsection (a) in both classified and unclassified form, the Secretary of Defense shall publish the unclassified form on the website of the Department of Defense.

(e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means— (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

(f) REPEAL.—Section 1245 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 128 Stat. 3566) is hereby repealed.

(g) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on January 31, 2030.